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It is argued that ‘history matters in Central and Eastern Europe’, forming an integral part of coming to 
terms with the past, where the law and, more specifically, the judiciary is greatly affected. My discussion 
focuses on Polish developments, analysing case studies from the Stalinist era (1944–1956) and martial law 
(1981–1983) and the manner in which the misadministration of justice is treated post-1989. Using archival 
material, the paper examines the complexities underpinning the judicial ‘identity’. While judicial 
independence is a complex and ambiguous concept, the problems are very real. 
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Introduction 
Research shows that two key periods (1944–1956 and 1981–1983) continually re-emerge in present day 
examinations (1989–present) of the judiciary in the context of de-communisation measures and in the wider 
framework of post-transitional justice, and it is in this vein that I will consider these periods.1 I begin with a 
brief overview of pre-war developments significant to the discussion about the purges of certain segments 
∗ The author would like to thank Dr Bela Chatterjee and Prof. Martin Krygier for their invaluable feedback, 
as well as colleagues at the Estonian Institute of Historical Memory for their support. Any errors are the 
author’s own. 
1 Transitional justice is a rich area. Post-transitional justice, in this paper, takes the approach that the state’s, 
in this case Poland’s, legal treatment of the past is ongoing. For a discussion of transitional justice in post-
Communist Europe, see A. Czarnota et al., eds. Rethinking the Rule of Law after Communism, (Budapest: 
CEU Press, 2005). For general discussions on transitional justice and its genealogy, see Ruti Teitel, 
“Transitional Justice Genealogy”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 16 (2003), pp. 69–94. 
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of society that were set in motion from 1944 onwards. The crimes the paper is concerned with were 
intentionally defined in vague terms in order to ensure that no one who could be a potential threat to the 
Communist regime could escape and more often than not cases, such as political crimes, were consigned to 
specified courts in order to ensure that the sentence could be secured to meet the objective of the law. I 
argue that the main protagonists – the law and the judges – have had dual roles to play in the guarantee and 
contravention of judicial independence. With the benefit of archival materials, it will be shown how the 
Polish experience sustains these assertions.2 Moreover, the extent of the protections afforded judicial 
independence and later transgressions against it comprise the judicial identity; which memories the judges 
and judiciary retain will have future repercussions for the judges and the profession. The concluding 
remarks critically examine selected reforms to demonstrate that these challenges to judicial independence 
are ongoing and of great consequence not only for Poland, but for all post-totalitarian states.3 The 
discussion shows that where there is damage to the prestige of the judiciary, the consequences are grave 
and, moreover, bad practice is not unlearnt overnight, making it imperative to identify and dismantle the 
continued practice of controlling the judiciary that characterised Communist rule. Yet, while the paper 
supports the guarantee of judicial independence, it carries the warning that in order to understand the 
principle we need to appreciate that it is an ambiguous concept, which poses certain difficulties when faced 
by real problems and hard cases that a post-Communist judiciary inevitably will have to address. My 
analysis critically contextualises these questions when discussing the Polish experience. The issues 
identified in this paper are reflected in the Central and Eastern European region to varying degrees. 
2 The archival material used in this article comes from the Polish Institute for National Remembrance 
(Instytut Pamieci Narodowej, hereafter: IPN), Warsaw, Poland. The IPN file referred to in this paper is 
from the archival material related to the Fieldorf trial, as well as the documentation amassed by the Polish 
prosecution in the post-1989 period. The file is entitled: IPN BU 1769/8 Akta Głowne Prokuratora w 
sprawie zbrodnia popełnionych na szkodę Augusta Emila Fieldorfa (Main Files in the Case Concerning 
Crimes Committed against August Emil Fieldorf, hereafter IPN file 1796). 
3 And stable democracies, as discussed by David Dyzenhaus, in “Judicial Independence, Transitional 
Justice and the Rule of Law”, Otago Law Review (2003), pp. 345–370. 
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To facilitate the discussion, a definition of the key terms is needed. It is important to note that this 
paper is part of a larger project that examines the misadministration of justice. The misadministration of 
justice is also referred to as judicial murder or court crime and can be understood as judges intentionally 
rendering a verdict that misapplies the law and results in serious human rights violations. Situations leading 
to the commission of judicial murder are accompanied by an assessment of the judiciary that is undertaken 
by the relevant state officials, not to mention civil society and the populace.4 Most examples of court 
crimes are found in totalitarian regimes where the judiciary is subservient to the executive will. The 
complicity of the judiciary gives rise to questions about judicial independence, the cornerstone of the 
judge’s work and a key component of the rule of law. The significance is further reinforced in a post-
totalitarian period when the nature of reforms can overlook and often ignore the fact that the history of 
judicial murder can continue to affect the work of the judge and sustained manipulation by the executive.  
There is of course a debate as to whether the post-Stalinist period in Poland can be described as 
totalitarian, a distinction resting with the aims and degree of control that was exerted by the state, with the 
assistance of the secret police, over the populace. It is not this paper’s intention to enter this debate but to 
point out that, while it could be argued that the post-Stalinist period was characterised by a move away 
from the use of terror to maintain total control towards holding and maintaining power,5 totalitarian rule 
has various dimensions; where law and post-totalitarianism meet its contours show the practice and 
tendencies are just as insidious as Stalinist terror in its consequences for individuals and wider society. 
Such a practice does not disappear overnight; instead, it is in this post-totalitarian period that one must be 
4 See A. Barahona De Brito, C. González-Enriquez and P. Aguilar, eds., The Politics of Memory: 
Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); K. McEvoy and 
L. McGregor, eds., Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change 
(Oxford: Hart, 2008), and L. Stan, ed., Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union: Reckoning with the Communist Past, BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European 
Studies (London: Routledge, 2009). 
5 See Andrzej Walicki, Marxism and the Leap into the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and Fall of the 
Communist Utopia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
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most vigilant; the technologies employed were such that people learned to police themselves with the 
memory of the Stalinist regime never far away.6  
An oft-debated concept, judicial independence is the “degree to which judges believe they can 
decide and do decide consistent with their own personal attitudes, values, and conceptions of the judicial 
role”.7 It is a salient aspect of the judicial identity following totalitarian rule, such as in Poland. The judge’s 
position is not only dependent upon assurances in the law (that can include constitutional and statutory 
guarantees), but also an institutional framework that provides for the separation of powers as an essential 
part of a democratic rule-of-law state. The second dimension of the judge’s work, the substantive, 
comprises interpretation of the law. It is in the interests of the citizen to make sure the judicial identity is 
based upon such solid foundations and to do otherwise has long-term, negative repercussions.  
 
Interlude 
“In the beginning there was corned beef. More accurately, in the beginning, there was war”.8 
 
If we briefly journey in time to the pre-war period, we can identify two key factors that would become 
relevant to the modern judiciary: independence and tradition. The Polish judiciary came into existence in 
1918, when an independent Poland re-emerged on the map. While the Polish judiciary was under the 
watchful eye of the executive even then, there is no reason to assume that the Polish pre-war judiciary was 
not independent. In fact, the judge of the pre-war period (1918–1939) was bolstered by the innovation of 
the period that concerned the creation of new codes and a constitution. It was a glorious but short-lived 
period within which the constitution and relevant statutes were guarantees of judicial independence.9 This 
6 See Adam Podgorecki and Vittorio Olgiati, eds., Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Law (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1996). 
7 Keith S. Rosenn, “The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America”, Inter-American Law 
Review, 19 (1987), p. 3. 
8 Joseph Brodsky, On Grief and Reason: Essays (New York: Penguin, 1995), p. 3. 
9 Section 4 of the 1921 Constitution outlined the position of the courts and the judiciary. The constitutional 
provisions, which conformed to the 1791 document, guaranteed judicial independence (Article 77). Judges 
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is the ‘engine’ of the judge’s work, of which judicial reasoning is an integral part. Despite pressures placed 
on the judiciary under an increasingly authoritarian regime, the judiciary enjoyed independence 
institutionally and substantively, as a profession and individually, albeit for a brief period.10 
 
Stalinist period (1944–1956) 
The pre-war interlude was ruptured by war, a discussion of which is outside the scope of this paper. What is 
of interest are efforts made, beginning in 1944, to systematically dismantle the Polish judiciary. The eastern 
territories of Poland that were occupied by the Committee for National Poland (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia 
Narodowy, hereafter PKWN) became their focal point. The PKWN turned its attention to setting up a state 
framework which included an administration of justice.11 This framework had an ideological underpinning 
(Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism) and a legal model that was ready to be imposed by the authorities. This 
could not be removed from office, transferred to a different place of office, suspended from office, or 
retired against their own will (Article 78) and judges were guaranteed judicial immunity (Article 79). The 
President of the Republic appointed judges (Article 76), while justices of the peace were elected by the 
populace. In political cases, or in cases entailing more serious punishment, the Constitution foresaw a jury 
trial (Article 83). According to Article 81, “the courts of justice shall not have the right to challenge the 
validity of statutes legally promulgated”. Since no form of judicial review was created, the power of the 
parliament (Sejm) was further strengthened. 
10 See Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, Volume II: 1795 to the Present (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1982). Judicial independence in the pre-war period in Poland is 
elaborated in Agata Fijalkowski, From Old Times to New Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate 2010), Chapter 2. 
11 The PKWN was established as a temporary executive organ in July 1944 by decree of the Committee for 
National Poland (Polski Komitet Narodowy). Under Leon Chajn, the Committee laid the plan to destroy any 
remaining evidence of the pre-war structure of the judiciary. The Committee worked hard to replace it with 
a politically disposed cadre of judicial personnel. Definitions of the PKWN and related organs are in 
Slownik historii Polski, Wydanie III (The Dictionary of Polish History, 3rd edn.) (Warszawa: Wiedza 
Powszechna, 1964), pp. 264–65. 
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model was created and perfected by Stalin’s top jurist, Prosecutor General Andrei Vyshinsky.12 Vyshinsky 
justified the use of terror in application of the law as the only true way of ensuring that the criminal law 
would satisfy revolutionary objectives which, for most of Stalin’s rule, meant identifying and eliminating 
the counterrevolutionary. Thus, underpinning the ideological drive outside of the Soviet Union, and into the 
territories to fall under Communist control, was a more calculated intent: to identify and eliminate potential 
threats to the Communist regime. The net would be cast wide to include all those who fought in the 
underground against the Nazi occupation, and extend to members of the intelligentsia: lawyers, doctors, 
journalists, writers, priests.13  
 The implications for the judiciary were serious because they were not only a target, but also part of 
the drive. As will be shown, this concerned a special type of judge who underwent a screening process 
before they went on to legal education. The screening process was undertaken at different times during the 
Stalinist period, and was conducted in a climate of great uncertainty within the administration of justice. 
Any semblance of stability was quickly replaced, with constant reminders, by the authorities, about the 
importance of the revolution. Implicating the judge in such an ideologically-driven plan inevitably affects 
the internal ethos of the judiciary to the detriment of the profession. It is not an exaggeration to contend that 
the nature of the plan created behaviour that demonstrated very little, if any, respect for human dignity; the 
individuals involved were most likely terrified and when they were not they often became the terrorisers. It 
was extremely difficult to refer to an administration of justice. The ‘capricious arbitrariness’ that 
characterised the regime14 is summarised by Scammel: 
 
12 See Andrei Vyshinsky, The Law of the Soviet State, trans. H. Babb (New York: Macmillan, 1950). 
13 Katyn is but one tragic example of this wider policy. The massacre, which was carried out by the Soviet 
secret police and resulted in the death of some 22,000 victims, has been acknowledged by the Russian 
parliament, and as Poland continues to struggle to achieve the balance between past abuses and justice. See 
“Russian Parliament: Stalin Ordered Katyn Massacres”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 26 November 
2010 at http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_duma_stalin_katyn/2231400.html (last accessed 22 June 2011). 
14 Fyodor Vasilevich Mochulsky, The Gulag Boss: A Soviet Memoir, trans. Deborah Kaple (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
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Worst of all was the terrifying fear and insecurity felt viscerally at all levels of society. Whether an 
illiterate peasant, cultivated artists or scientist, high Party official, or general, you sensed an 
invisible trapdoor beneath your feet that might yawn open at any moment and drop you into an 
inferno from which there was usually no escape.15 
  
The Stalinist period was well underway by 1944 and although his rule would last another nine years, it is 
significant to note the speed with which the specific initiatives were undertaken to build an administration 
of justice in Poland. The miscarriages of justice that would occur from 1944 onwards could not have been 
committed without the complicity of key actors that included representatives of all three branches of 
government. It would be a mistake, however, to treat the executive, legislative and judicial branches as 
having an equal footing at this time. If anything, what the paper demonstrates is the fragility of the 
judiciary. It would be correct to contend that the legislature was in a no better position. 
 
The new legal framework had certain features crucial to our discussion. 
 
Secret sections 
The use of secret trials is not a novel idea.16 In the 20th century, secret trials came to be associated with 
certain measures that made a mockery of justice and were mainly used to eliminate political opposition in 
the Communist world. Collective targets were identified as ‘politically suspect’ by authorities from 
amongst the respective Communist societies. The architects of the legal framework introduced secret 
sections within the common courts. The work of these secret sections was based on the secret trials and 
show trials that had been perfected in the Soviet Union, in terms of nature and style of the trial proceedings 
that were based on a ‘script’ of charges and the involvement of carefully selected judicial officials (judge, 
prosecutor, defence counsel), all of whom ensured that the pre-determined outcome of the trial would be 
realised. In Poland the secret trial was transformed into secret sections that were introduced in the regional 
15 Michael Scammell, “Circles of Hell”, The New York Review of Books, 28 April 2011. 
16 See George Hodos, Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1987). 
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courts and the Supreme Court. Within these sections, intense pressure was placed on judges by high-
ranking political officials, as well as the secret police. 
 
Disrespect for due process 
Communication between counsel and the defendant was controlled and limited in trials, as was the 
questioning of witnesses. The 1950 secret trial of August Emil Fieldorf is an excellent example. Brigadier 
General Fieldorf was sentenced to death in 1950 for carrying out killings of, inter alia, Soviet partisans and 
members of the Red Army, in collaboration with the German forces. This was a crime defined by a 1944 
decree (see the next section). The Fieldorf case, as with others of that time, represents the fate of the 
majority of Poles who were members of the Polish underground. This part of the Polish experience was 
mimicked throughout the region. Cases were built on the fabrication of facts, falsified evidence and 
evidence obtained under torture during brutal interrogation. Archival material shows that the secret trials 




Fabricated charges were based on vague provisions found in one of the series of decrees passed by the 
PKWN between 1944 and 1946 while the Polish Criminal Code of 1932 remained in force, with some 
revisions made to keep up with the Communist ideology. Fieldorf and his counterparts were charged under 
Article 1(1) of a decree from 31 August 1944 on punishment for fascist-Hitlerite crimes and traitors of the 
Polish nation. The term ‘fascist-Hitlerite’ was vague enough to use against persons deemed to be a political 
threat. The Decree on State Security of 30 October 1944 was another example of a repressive piece of 
legislation which addressed attempts to overthrow the Polish state and terrorist attacks, subversive activity, 
and sabotage. The Criminal Code of 1932 was de facto suspended by with the creation of the Military 
17 IPN, supra note 2, file 1796. For secondary sources see, for example, S. Marat and J. Snopkiewicz, 
Zbrodnia, sprawa generala Fieldorfa – “Nila” (A Crime, The Case of General Fieldorf – “Nil”) (Warsaw, 
1989) or M. Fieldorf and L. Zachuta, General Fieldorf “Nil”: fakty, dokumenty, relacje (General Fieldorf 
“Nil”: facts, documents, relations (Warsaw: Biblioteka “Niepodleglosci”, 2006), two volumes. 
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Criminal Code.  The draconian decree from 13 June 1946 also expanded the competence of the military 





In a democracy, judges occupy “a unique position. [The judiciary] is called upon to decide disputes that 
cannot or should not be left to the political branches or private individuals”.19 In other words, the judiciary 
enjoys equal standing to the executive and legislative branches of government. All three form part of the 
checks and balances system and all three operate under the principle of the separation of powers. This is a 
simplified view, of course, but the main point is that the judiciary exercises its powers independently. In a 
transition, which is characterised by a “shift in political orders”,20 the relationship becomes more acute 
because the law is “caught between past and future”.21 As the Polish judiciary entered the post-World War 
II era, the authorities exploited this gap and used legal education as a guise. It became a key part of a 
screening process that comprised several critical stages.  
Stage 1 
The first stage of verifying judges occurred in different periods until 1950. Procedures were created by the 
authorities to examine the backgrounds of the judiciary. According to Rzeplinski, the new leadership was 
18 This is only a selection of decrees from the period. For further information see Fijalkowski, supra note 
10, p. 96. 
19 Peter Hack, “Introduction: Judicial Integrity”, in Judicial Integrity, ed. A. Sajo (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2004), p. 5. 
20 Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Rule of Law”, in Rethinking the Rule of Law after Communism, A. Czarnota et 
al., eds. (Budapest: CEU Press, 2005), p. 279. 
21 Ibid., p. 279. 
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stuck 22 as courts only took on university law graduates and an unknown number of pre-war lawyers and, 
increasingly, graduates from the Soviet Union. In the eyes of the authorities, the weakest group came in the 
form of university law graduates from pre-war Poland as these candidates wanted to learn law and not 
ideology. This was seen to affect criminal law judgments, which the authorities found too liberal.23 In 
response, new schools were quickly created to examine judges and test for political disposability. Their 
removal was approved by the Minister of Justice. Decrees from 22 January 1946 and April 1946 facilitated 
the creation of a new school for judges and prosecutors; deanships were held by judges who worked in the 
secret sections.24 The curricula of the law schools set up between 1948 and 1954 were meant to 
complement the decrees passed during this time. The education was brief and graduates could find 
themselves adjudicating or prosecuting cases within a year of completing their studies. In other words, clear 
moves were made to control judicial officials, as well as to demote the status of a judge both professionally 
and morally. 
Stage 2 
The second phase involved indoctrination in ideology.25 In this fashion, judicial decision making lost its 
inherent feature of independence and impartiality. Certainly, the period 1944–1945 critically exposed the 
vulnerability of the judiciary in the Polish territories. The Soviet-led authorities gained political control 
over the courts by changing their jurisdiction so as to minimise forms of external control over the executive 
that underpins the separation of powers. In his sobering study, Kurczewski relates the manner in which the 
22 Andrzej Rzeplinski, Sadownictwo w Polsce Ludowej: miedzy dypozycyjnoscia, a niezawisloscia (The 
Judiciary in People’s Poland: Between Disposability and Independence) (Warsaw: Oficyjna Wydawnicza 
Pokolenie, 1989). Also IPN, supra note 2, file 1769, p. 1399. 
23 Ibid., p. 1399. 
24 Ibid. 
25See Rzeplinski, supra note 22. 
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appointments to the judiciary and secret police were dictated by Soviet functionaries and manuals.26 
Final stage 
The final phase concerned reform of the prosecution to conform to Soviet lines, although this institution 
never attained the status of the Soviet counterpart.27 No social need could be satisfied unless defined 
through the lens of the politically disposed judge acting, in his or her view, on behalf of what they or the 
authorities perceived as good for society.  
It is important to consider the wider context in which limited opportunities were offered to pre-war 
judges who wanted to enter the judiciary. Any hope of maintaining independence was lost without this 
group participating in the profession. Clearly, the value was placed on politically disposed judges. 
Although limited standards of law applied so as satisfy minimum expectations, eventually the gradual 
isolation and marginalisation of political opposition allowed for complete control by the authorities, i.e. the 
Communist Party. Not surprisingly, legal knowledge was not a priority.28 Corruption was encouraged and 
in some cases the judge approached his superior (i.e. court president) and indicated that each capital 
sentence rendered had its fee.29 This was tolerated by the authorities, at least at first. But this toleration was 
not commonly shared by judicial officials. These concerns related to the absence of legal knowledge, 
despite showing the necessary political loyalty. This became an increasing concern as secret sections began 
to render capital sentences, and by the 1950s some officials became anxious. For example, in 1956 Henryk 
Ciesluk, the Deputy General Prosecutor, wrote to Edward Ochab, First Secretary of the Communist Party, 
26 See Jacek Kurczewski, Resurrection of Rights in Poland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 
31–66. 
27 Lech Garlicki, “Politics and Political Independence of the Judiciary”, in Judicial Integrity, ed. A. Sajo 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), p. 126. Also see William Butler, Soviet Law, 2nd edn. (London: 
Butterworths, 1988). 
28 Ibid. 
29 IPN, supra note 2, file 1769. Also Maria Stanowska and Adam Strzembosz, Sedziowie Warszawscy w 
Czasie Proby 1981–1989 (Warsaw Judges at a Time of Trial) (Warsaw: IPN, 2007), p. 25. 
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about the illegality of the secret sections and the lack of judicial experience on the part of one judge.30 As 
noted by Rzeplinski, the identified concern was evidence of knowledge among the legal community that 
transgressions were taking place. The courts, in particular the secret sections, had ample opportunities to 
know the facts and ensure that trial proceedings and procedures were being applied correctly. No 
justification could be presented for not knowing. An ideological drive should not take away from the 
application of due process principles but, as such, this was not part of Lenin’s doctrine of the “unity of 
power”.31 The judges at this time would undoubtedly also have been aware of the position taken at the 
Nuremberg Trials of 1946–1947, in particular as concerns the debate going on at that time regarding natural 
law and positivism, and questions related to morality in the application of law and notions of justice.32 
In his memoirs, the former Supreme Court judge Waclaw Barcikowski correctly refers to this 
1944–1956 period as “rogue”.33 Without doubt, the Polish state of the mid-1940s was heavily influenced 
and controlled by the Soviets. Even the decrees issued by the PKWN did not respect the amended law on 
courts that applied the relevant, pre-war statutes.34 The struggle against 'the enemy' could easily be 
imported into a country like Poland dealing with the aftermath of occupation by two powers, making the 
imposition of the Vyshinsky model of justice less problematic. 
Living in Limbo 
The closing of the Stalinist chapter was not without effect. Research supports the contention that the 
renunciation of the misadministration of justice associated with the secret courts had a negative effect on 
30 IPN, supra note 2, file 1769. 
31 Vladimir Lenin, The State and Revolution, in Selected Works in Three Volumes, Vol. 2, 2nd edn 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967). 
32 Stanowska and Strzembosz, supra note 29. 
33 Waclaw Barcikowski, W kregu prawa i polityki (Within the Circle of Law and Politics) (Warsaw: KAW, 
1988), p. 1402. 
34 The relevant pre-war laws were reactivated on 22 July 1944, but these did not set out minimum criteria. 
The competence of the PKWN was itself dubious in terms of competence – but the discussion of this lies 
outside the scope of this paper. 
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judges and public prosecutors.35 The party continued to exert control over the judiciary with respect to, 
inter alia, the legislation concerning the judiciary, judicial appointments, legal education, and judicial 
terms. Certainly for all persons, including judges, the 1950s were permeated with a sense of post-war 
exhaustion.  
In the end, the ‘purge’ undertaken from 1944 to 1954 was short-lived, but effective. The 
recognition that mistakes were committed under the Stalinist regime affected the Polish judiciary too, 
although arguably, however, these effects were limited. In 1956 the Wasilkowska Commission was set up 
to investigate the secret sections.36 The report focused on the most active secret sections that functioned in 
Warsaw. The Commission found that the first secret sections were created within the Ministry of Justice. 
The secret police (which included the Soviet secret police at that time, the NKVD, and the nascent Polish 
secret police, Urzad Bezpieczenstwa, which worked closely with, and at times for, its Soviet counterpart) 
and Prosecutor General appointed judges nominally, as none of the officials selected were affiliated with a 
court. Secret sections within the courts themselves would follow shortly thereafter. Not surprisingly, the 
same names would appear. The reliance and political disposability of this small group of judges ensured the 
objectives of the secret sections were fulfilled. The Commission went on to identify cases in which the 
proceedings were illegal, in which the reasoning for the sentence rendered was simply unjustified. 
Concerning especially egregious cases, judges were named. As far as penal measures were concerned, only 
one judge was disciplined and forced to retire, but he was still able to collect his pension.37 Other judges 
were delegated to the Ministry of Justice and many of them filtered into the common courts, including the 
Supreme Court. This was important as the authorities knew who they could rely on in the event of political 
crises. This would come to fruition in the 1960s and later during martial law. Corruption and opportunism 
were strong messages sent to newer colleagues. In sum, the 1956 admissions did not provide any real, 
meaningful reform of the judiciary. This culminated in a legal system that would in some ways become 
stagnant as from 1956. It also sent a clear message to the judges: they were very much under the eye of the 
authorities. 




                                                 
 Martial law and beyond (1981–1983) 
As a consequence of all this, between 1956 and 1981 the judiciary did not operate independently. Political 
pressure placed on judges continued, notably with the introduction of the Law on the Supreme Court from 
1962 concerning appointments to the Supreme Court for five-year terms, one of the most criticised features 
of the Communist judicial system seen as blatant disregard for judicial independence.38 Further, the 1960s 
had seen a wave of political crimes related to economic offences – this meant pressure and reliance on 
judges to ensure severe sentencing in order to meet the objectives of the campaign against such economic 
exploitation, in particular by individuals gaining a profit.39 
 
Legal education 
Legal education also underwent another reform in the 1950s. Having an education became important for 
the authorities, and class became a non-issue in state eyes. Thus, a certain cohort of law graduates began to 
emerge in the 1970s which had master’s level law degrees they had achieved after five years. Most, but not 
all, law students who had selected criminal law as their specialisation in the judicial route became Party 
members. In sum, the judges who had been educated from the 1970s onwards not only possessed the skills 
and energy to participate in the reforms that would eventually be set out by Solidarity, but they did not face 
the internal pressure colleagues from previous years had experienced as the judges involved in the secret 
sections began to retire.  
 
Civil society 
The surprise in the story is what the years 1980 and 1981 held in store for the judiciary. This came in the 
form of a vibrant, vital space important for the development of civil society. Although this was a slow 
process and occurred informally at first, the discussion played an extremely valuable role in the 
promulgation of human rights. 
38 See Rzeplinski, supra note 22. 
39 Ibid. 
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The evolution of support for the Solidarity opposition movement (Solidarnosc) within judicial 
ranks is not well documented. Studies conducted in the area rely on the best known developments to be 
found at the Supreme Court at that time. Suffice it to say, the new breed of judge allowed for the reception 
of the movement and became a logical part of its momentum.40 This is because Solidarity had already 
attracted membership within the ranks of the regional civil courts in 1980. The choice of civil courts was no 
accident. It was clear though that the criminal courts would be staffed by Party members or those loyal to 
the Party and Party line. Membership in Solidarity grew very quickly and research shows that the judges 
were well aware of and attracted to the programme of ‘socialism with a human face’. Likewise, judges 
would not have been isolated from regional developments in human rights protection as the abolition of the 
death penalty movement in Poland indicates, for example.41 While there are debates about specific numbers 
of members among the judiciary, the fact remains that the movement had strength in numbers in Warsaw. 
Rzeplinski cites 10,000 members in the Administration of Justice that employed 24,000: about 1,000 judges 
(in courts) or 30 percent belonged to Solidarity.42 Others report that in 1981 there were 3,096 judges, 867 
of whom were judges who belonged to Solidarity.43 The most active judges were younger regional court 
judges as opposed to judges within the higher courts. Almost everyone working in this field concurs that 
support for Solidarity was much higher than the figures suggest. 
40 A connection was made between the intelligentsia and working class in the 1970s; after March 1968 it 
was extremely important, if not symbolic. There were student riots after Adam Mickiewicz’s play Dziady 
(Forefathers’ Eve) had been banned under Soviet pressure for its anti-Soviet flavour. The state used this to 
create conflict between students and the working class, and there was an ugly anti-Semitic bent whereby 
propaganda claimed that the main instigators of the riots were members of the Jewish intelligentsia. 
Zbigniew Gostynski and Alan Garfield, “Taking the Other Road: Polish Legal Education During the Past 
Thirty Years”, Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 7 (1993), pp. 243–286. 
41 Ibid. Also see Jerzy Jasinski, “Kosciol wobec kary smierc” (The Church with Respect to the Death 
Penalty), Panstwo i Prawo, 7 (1995), p. 56 and Agata Fijalkowski, “Abolition of the Death Penalty in 
Central and Eastern Europe”, Tilburg Foreign Law Review, 7 (2001), pp. 62–83. 
42 Rzeplinski, supra note 22. 
43 Ibid. 
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In addition to commenting on draft legislation, the centre of its work was ensuring guarantees of 
judicial independence. The memory of Stalinist crimes committed by the courts was strong, and it 
permeated discussions.44 While this topic was generally restricted under the regimes of Wladyslaw 
Gomulka (1956–1970) and Edward Gierek (1970–1980), the new cohort placed this period on the agenda 
for discussion, and made efforts to secure more autonomy and an enhanced role in the selection and 




Martial law was imposed on 13 December 1981. It was declared by the Communist Party of the Polish 
People’s Republic. The Council of State (Rada Panstwa) issued three decrees significant to the operation of 
a state of emergency:  
 
(1) martial law;  
(2) specific crimes under martial law; and 
(3) the transfer of certain crimes to military courts, which meant amending the way that the 
relevant military courts functioned during martial law.  
 
The promulgation of the decrees was in itself unconstitutional (under the then Article 31). Although a 
detailed discussion of this lies outside the scope of this paper, in 1992 the Polish parliament found that the 
decision to impose martial law was illegal.45 All three decrees were published in the Dziennik Ustaw (Daily 
Laws) on 14 December 1981, leading to further ambiguity as to when the decrees actually came into force. 
It is important to note that the catalogue of offences introduced under martial law was vast. The 
competence of the military courts was expanded to the decrees. The jurisdiction extended to two crimes in 
particular, found in the then 1969 Criminal Code, namely against political and economic interests of the 
state (the People’s Republic) and public order, as well as crimes listed under Articles 47 and 48 in the 
44 Stankowska and Strzembosz, supra note 29. 
45 This resulted in the cases brought before the Tribunal of State. 
 16 
                                                 
decrees previously mentioned. It is worthwhile recalling that the 1969 Polish Criminal Code was a 
repressive piece of legislation.46 The punitive character of criminal law was even further compounded by 
the decrees. Under martial law, the jurisdiction of the military courts was extended to include crimes that 
were usually dealt with by the common courts, which were already sentencing people to longer periods of 
deprivation of liberty in a climate of an increasing punitive nature. Judges were forced, under threat, to 
preside over the military courts.47 The decree stated that once martial law was lifted, these cases would 
return to the common courts. The reality was otherwise. According to Article 23(2) of the Law Concerning 
Certain Legal Regulations during Socio-Economic Crises and Other Legal Changes, these cases remained 
in the military courts’ jurisdiction.48 
Soon after martial law was imposed, some judicial officials took the opportunity to voluntarily 
hand in their resignations. Solidarity became a proscribed organisation in 1981, which led the Council of 
State to force the resignation of two Supreme Court judges on the basis that they had declared loyalty to the 
organisation. Some 40 judges were dismissed for their unreliability.49 At this time, the military authorities 
advised the judges in the Warsaw courts to submit the names of colleagues who were politically 
unreliable.50 Several judges and prosecutors were interned for crimes that carried a four-year penalty and 
anyone suspected of sympathising with Solidarity was harassed and required to justify their decisions that 
led to the acquittal of well-known activists. The usual purge of unreliable judges was underway, as was a 
climate of uncertainty and fear. 
As the purge extended to society, draconian measures were accompanied by severe sentencing, 
resulting in serious consequences for the defendant. During the period in question (1981–1983), the cases 
that dominated the courts’ workload were political crimes. For example, 62.8 percent of convictions were 
for political crimes; in 119 cases against 164 persons, defendants were found guilty of contributing in some 
46 See Maria Los, Communist Ideology, Law and Crime (New York: St Martin’s, 1988).  
47 Ibid., p. 45. 
48 See Stankowska and Strzembosz, supra note 29. Note that Poland ratified the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1977.  
49 See Los, Communist Ideology, supra note 46.  
50 Ibid., p. 45. 
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fashion to Solidarity-related activities or engaging in peaceful protest. In a 1983 speech to parliament, the 
Minister of the Interior reported that 2,580 people had been sentenced for offences against the state and 
1,462 people for violating the martial law decree.51 Due to space limits, this section only considers a short 
selection of offences under the decree to illustrate their character. 
Crimes included under Article 48 of the decree included crimes of enemy propaganda. This 
comprised several elements, namely the dissemination of information harmful to the state’s interests, public 
order offences, and disrespect towards state symbols. The category of enemy propaganda was intentionally 
wide. Usually those charged under this provision were found guilty of possessing leaflets or other material 
that spoke out against martial law or for the freedom of political prisoners. In most cases, the prosecution 
asked for the four-year sentence, much harsher than what would have been proposed in normal 
circumstances related to public order offences which, as noted above, was already severe. An indication of 
the arbitrary and unforgiving character of these measures was revealed more recently in case reviews 
undertaken by the Supreme Court. As reported by Stanowska and Strzembosz, all those convicted under 
Article 48 who had been involved in the dissemination of material defined as enemy propaganda were later 
rehabilitated.52 There were 302 Article 48 cases, involving 563 people. When it carried out a review in 
1996 on cases concerning the dissemination of material, the Supreme Court rehabilitated all the defendants 
on the grounds that it was impossible for such activities to lead to public disorder. In the Court’s view, the 
protest materials that were viewed as subversive by the Communist regime were regarded as socio-political 
commentaries and critiques essential to a democracy. 
Martial law was lifted in 1983, but it was clear that any forms of dissent would need to be 
tempered. While judges continued to be pressured until the fall of the regime, their operation can underpin 
a reflection about the nature of judicial subjugation and resistance. As noted, the military courts’ 
jurisdiction was extended to hear certain crimes. While the common courts retained control over some 
criminal cases, it was apparent that political crimes were consigned to military courts, for the most part. For 
example, for the 1981–1983 period, the Warsaw military court convicted 453 people in political cases, 
51 Ibid. 
52 Stanowska and Strzembosz, supra note 29. 
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compared to 192 by the common courts.53 Although the lifting of martial law was accompanied by an 
amnesty for political prisoners detained under the martial law decrees, it was supplemented by the 
government’s warning that any anti-state activities would not be tolerated, leaving room for harsher 
measures to be applied to the recidivists. 
In terms of numbers of judges, it is important to note that 226 judges adjudicated in the cases in 
question nationwide. In Warsaw, this concerned 105 judges in the common courts and 72 judges in the 
Warsaw military court. In the Supreme Court, 51 judges dealt with political cases, with 26 in the criminal 
division. A number of political crimes were appealed to the Supreme Court’s criminal division in the 1982–
1984 period. These cases concerned political crimes that were heard in courts throughout the country. By 
and large,  when dealing with political crimes most judges in the common courts sought to read all files and 
evidence closely, and render a decision that was in favour of the defendant. In several instances, the court 
acquitted the defendant or found the defendant not guilty of the crimes – in this period there were more 
findings of not guilty in political than in ordinary crimes. Prior to martial law, a finding of not guilty 
accounted for 2 percent of criminal cases; this increased to just over 20 percent in cases related to political 
crimes.54 What motivated the judge is hard to say – for Rzeplinski, for example, regardless of the nature of 
the regime some judges carried out their work according to procedure and found in favour of the weaker 
party.55 In any event, it is fair to say that judges felt frustrated about the general view that seemed to be 
held relative to their alleged disposability to the regime under martial law. There were voices that strongly 
spoke out against this; the Deputy Minister of Justice, Adam Strzembosz, along with other judges who 
were also members of Solidarity, tried hard to refute this image.56 
Another important point relates to the younger judges in this period, for whom the Stalinist crimes 
committed by the judiciary were a memory. Of course, memory can also be direct experience, but the 
authorities wanted to be sure. To reactivate judicial subjugation, the authorities had to exert control by 
53 IPN, supra note 2, file 1769. 
54 Stanowska and Strzembosz, supra note 29. 
55 Rzeplinski, supra note 22.  
56 Maria Los, “In the Shadow of Totalitarian Law: The Law-Making in Post-Communist Poland”, Working 
Paper 9301C (February 1993). 
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threat and the new cohort of young judges was a good target. “They realized that Solidarity emerged only 
because they [the authorities] had overlooked the ‘dangerous’ moment of the dissipation of fear and the 
unprecedented rise of hope”.57 
In contrast, a review of the Supreme Court paints a less rosy picture than initially perceived. The 
few scholars working in this area have confirmed that the Supreme Court seemed to support the severe 
approach taken as regards political crimes. For example, 45.4 percent of the cases confirmed the original 
sentence. At times the sentence was increased. All extraordinary reviews went against the defendant. Note 
that 45 judges were adjudicating these cases; 35 would hear the extraordinary reviews. Certain judges’ 
names would appear more frequently, as noted in their average workload which was much heavier (an 
allocation of 53 cases) than their colleagues (an allocation of 18 cases). The picture that emerges indicates a 
pattern of pressure exerted by the authorities, as observed by one scholar, from 1982–1984 on an informal 
secret section to hear political cases operated in the Supreme Court.58 
Not surprisingly, under martial law political crimes went hand in hand with severe punishment. 
Human rights bodies are unforgiving where the state subjects civilians to military courts; this reproof is 
justified where such courts displace the common courts within the jurisdiction. According to Dyzenhaus, 
martial law represents a puzzle because “it is an absence of law prescribed by law under the concept of 
necessity – a legal blackhole, but one created perhaps even in some sense bounded, by law”.59 The 
significance of the question as to whether officials can be authorised to act outside of the rule of law, based 
on a constitutionally valid suspension is a political question, as indicated above, and as seen in this section 
one that involved serious transgressions of judicial independence. 
In conclusion, the new cohort of graduates with a more advanced law degree who had graduated in 
the 1970s were now becoming judges who possessed the skills and energy to participate in the reforms that 
would eventually be set out by Solidarity. The space was provided for by the retirement of those judges 
who, despite being involved in the secret sections, had been permitted to adjudicate until retirement, which 
57 Los, Communist Ideology, supra note 46, p. 44. 
58 Stanowska and Strzembosz, supra note 29. Also see Krzysztof Kauba, “Orzecznictwo stanu wojennego” 
(Case Law during Martial Law), Przeglad Sadowy, 5–6 (1992), pp. 25–37.   
59 David Dyzenhaus, “The Puzzle of Martial Law”, University of Toronto Law Journal, 59 (2009), p. 2. 
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did not go unnoticed. However, the pressure, the threat of redeployment, and disciplinary hearings applied 
to break the cadre resulted in general demoralisation. Likewise, the most repressive period showed the 
greatest leniency on the part of the common courts and illustrates that arguably a degree of judicial 
independence can exist in such a regime, where cases were consigned to another less independent space 
and where the regime continued to resort to instilling fear in new generations of judges to ensure its will is 
followed to the detriment of the profession and contravention of civil liberties and tenets of judicial 
independence. In this way, the memory of Stalinism was perpetuated. 
Interestingly, this period saw the establishment of the Constitutional Tribunal in 1982 and the 
Commissioner for the Protection of Citizens’ Rights (Ombudsman) in 1988. Here there in no intention to 
discuss these at length but to point out that, as measures, this was arguably an incredibly bold move on the 
part of General Jaruzelski’s regime since both institutions are based on the protection of civil liberties and 
human rights and adjudicating on the constitutionality of the law, respectively. However, key limitations 
were placed on these institutions; the Constitutional Tribunal only became operational in 1986, and had no 
competence to adjudicate on constitutional matters arising prior to that time.60 
 
Post-1989 Developments  
“A jewelled movement turning in Starling’s unnatural calm: For an instant many windows in her mind 
aligned and she saw far across her own experience”.61 
 
This reference to Clarice Starling’s recollection of her childhood illustrates the power of experience and 
memory, the significance of which can be extraordinary. The moment the Polish judge’s past crystallised 
and could be articulated came between February and April 1989 when a series of round table talks took 
place between leaders and representatives of Solidarity and the outgoing government. Concerning the 
Administration of Justice, the proposals set out at the talks by the opposition showed evidence of a 
60 Stanislaw Frankowski, “A Comment on Professor Garlicki’s Article ‘Constitutional Developments in 
Poland’: The Lyrics Sound Familiar, But are They Really Playing Our Song?”, Saint Louis University Law 
Journal, 32 (1988), pp. 737–751. 
61 Thomas Harris, Hannibal (London: William Heinemann, 1999), p. 477. 
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commitment to judicial independence, which had been blatantly violated during these two periods 
considered above, and inter alia included: 
• the introduction of a constitutional provision which guarantees judicial 
independence and precludes the removal or transfer of judges save for reasons of ill 
health or disciplinary charges; 
• the abolition of judicial terms for Supreme Court judges; 
• the abolition of the oath of office required to be taken by judges before assuming 
office; 
• the constitutional establishment of the National Council for the Judiciary (Krajowa 
Rada Sadownictwa), comprising members of the judicial as well as the executive 
and legislative branches of government, which would take decisions on future 
candidates for the judiciary; 
• a wider discretion granted to judicial self-government to decide on, inter alia, 
nominations of judicial presidents; 
• the selection of members to the district judicial branch from the general pool of 
judges from all branches; 
• the introduction of terms to the office of judicial presidents; 
• the modification of the guiding institutions of the administration of justice and the 
court practice as laid down by the Supreme Court in such a way that they do not 
violate the principles of the subordination of judges only to the law; and 
• the creation of judicial benches which are granted the right to directly petition the 
Constitutional Tribunal in matters concerning the constitutionality of constitutional 
acts, normative acts or legislative acts.62 
 
62 “Sprawozdanie z posiedzen Podzespolu do sprawy reformy prawa i sadow” (Report of the Sessions of 
the Subtable on Legal and Court Reform), Porozumienia Okraglego Stolu (The Round Table Talks), 
Warsaw, 6 February–5 April 1989, pp. 60–61. 
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In this fashion 1989 presented judges with the opportunity to form a new cadre, which meant the chance to 
‘shake off’ the Communist legacy and forge a viable, independent judiciary. In addition, the Polish 
judiciary applied the governmental policy of the 1990s of gruba, czarna kreska (a thick, black line) to 
itself. ‘Self-cleansing’ was becoming part of the approach to the past. Judges were aware that not all of 
them had demonstrated resistance and that subservience to the Party had resulted in damage to individual 
defendants and the judiciary, leading to the supposition that “[o]nce normal conditions [were] established, 
the judiciary [would] cleanse itself of the morally depraved, compromised individuals”.63 Eventually, it was 
concluded that the approach adopted by the Ministry of Justice was fundamentally flawed. Polish Senators 
became increasingly frustrated: 
 
The assumption of self-cleansing has not proven correct…it is quite evident in courts…We know that 
this internal self-cleansing of our courts of law has never happened.64 
 
The importance and credibility of these revolutionary changes were undermined by the post-Communist 
government’s decision not to carry out a ‘verification’ of judges based on their past records. The Deputy 
Minister of Justice continued to argue that Polish judges had tried very hard to preserve their integrity 
under tremendous political pressures. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court was the only court post-
1989 to have undergone verification and to have implemented life terms of office in lieu of a five-year 
term.65 These are important guarantees that can also work as incentives. 
Law and politics, however, were to collide. The political elite at that time saw the transition as an 
exercise in ‘self-cleansing’ resulting in ‘self-dismantling’. There was no scope to construct new institutions 
so, ultimately, such a policy was doomed to fail. This, in turn, would eventually be interpreted as weak. Yet 
the alternative of adopting stronger measures ran the risk of being hijacked by political leaders and used to 
support contentions that the Polish judiciary was politically tainted. The allegation that the judiciary was 
63 Los, “In the Shadow”, supra note 56, p. 9. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Marek Domagalski, “Sad Najwyzszy zmienil sie przez ostatnie 20 lat”, Rzeczpospolita, 11 September 
2010. 
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comprised of judges who were politically tainted then came to haunt the judges in two ways: as part of their 
way to reform the judiciary in reply to the Stalinist period and martial law, and now externalised as part of 
the political campaign.66 
In light of this allegation and the contexts set out above, it is important to revisit the prevalent 
theme that connects our periods. Judicial independence is a relatively elusive concept. It does not mean that 
“all judges remain oblivious to political considerations”.67 As noted, judicial independence can be found in 
totalitarian regimes where common courts functioned independently, and where politically sensitive cases 
were diverted to special courts. Judicial independence is the “degree to which judges believe they can 
decide and do decide consistent with their own personal attitudes, values, and conceptions of the judicial 
role”.68 This is, of course, not enough as Holmes observes, since judges may have personal attitudes that 
ignore the law. Moreover, even in a state that is recognised as a democracy, in which the majority of judges 
act independently, a hidden or ‘latent’ practice might exist which allows for politically sensitive cases to be 
transferred to the group of reliable judges.69 As seen above, political leaders, such as Cieslak or the 
Wasilkowska Commission, expressed concern about the judges in the secret sections, both incidents call for 
further research. Alongside this, we have seen that secret sections were re-established in the 1980s to deal 
with political cases in line with political objectives; once again using criminal law as a political weapon.   
66 This debate began in the early years of post-Communism. Several judges stepped forward to defend their 
position, claiming to have been following the law. See the debate between the following authors, a lawyer 
and a judge, respectively: Andrzej Litwak, “Reforma … bez reform” (Reform … Without Reform), 
Wokanda (Trial Calendar), 14 July 1991, p. 9; Waldemar Myga, “Protest “komucha” (Protest of a 
‘Commie’), Wokanda (Trial Calendar), 18 August 1991, p. 4. 
67 Keith S. Rosenn, “The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America”, Inter-American Law 
Review, 19 (1987), p. 3. 
68 Ibid. 
69 See Stephen Holmes, “Judicial Independence as Ambiguous Reality and Insidious Illusion,” in Ronald 
Dworkin, ed., From Liberal Values to Democratic Transition. Essays in Honor of János Kis (Budapest: 
CEU Press, 2004), pp. 3–14. 
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In light of these experiences, one can posit that the post-Communist judge is or should be even 
more aware of the importance of and need to address the existence or lack of judicial independence. In light 
of Bobek’s comment that the “rich spectrum of transition problems” faced by Central and Eastern European 
judiciaries needs to be considered against the “issues of societal, personal and mental changes within the 
judiciaries in the region”,70 then perhaps it is time to critically examine how real these concerns are and 
whether they can be addressed.71 This entails a re-assessment of policies that include the question of 
unfinished business in relation to allegations of a tainted judiciary that shaped the initial response in the 
form of self-cleansing.72 In other words, the law might provide an answer. The discussion now focuses on 
key legal developments rather than legal education, which has also undergone an important reform. 
In this vein, it is important to note a 1997 amendment to the law on common courts and other laws 
that sets out the conditions for retirement.73 This amendment was inspired by the pre-war period. In fact, it 
is a return to the pre-war legislation in an effort to bolster judicial prestige and introduce stability into the 
judiciary. The flaw that was identified in this move was the risk that those judges who had been involved in 
applying the law in a draconian fashion during the time periods mentioned above would go unpunished and 
claim state benefits. Related questions were already addressed in the 1990s when moves were made to 
curtail the generous pensions of Communist officials.74 The result was Article 7(1) that exempted key 
categories of judges and prosecutors from these privileges: 
1. judges or prosecutors who served in the Soviet secret police (NKVD) or other related organs 
in the 1939–1956 period; 
70 Michal Bobek, “The Fortress of Judicial Independence and the Mental Transitions of Central European 
Judiciaries”, European Public Law, 14 (2008), pp. 1–20. 
71 Elin Skaar, Judicial Independence and Human Rights in Latin American: Violations, Politics, and 
Prosecution (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
72 See Martin Krygier, “Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism”, in Rethinking the Rule of Law 
after Communism, A. Czarnota et al., eds. (Budapest: CEU Press, 2005), pp. 265–277. 
73 Dz. U [1997] no. 124, item 782. 
74 See Matthew Day, “Poland Punishes Former Communist Leaders by Cutting Pensions”, Daily Telegraph 
(5 January 2010). 
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2. judges or prosecutors who served the Polish secret police (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa) and 
collaborated to eliminate persons engaged in Polish independence in the 1944–1956 period; 
3. judges or prosecutors who worked in the military courts in the 1955–1956 period and were 
involved in the fabrication of criminal cases against members of the Polish independence 
movement; and 
4. judges and prosecutors who served in the secret sections. 
 
As this concerned judges in retirement, the governing body of judges, the National Council for the 
Judiciary (hereafter, KRS), became involved. The KRS is a constitutionally created organ with the mandate 
to oversee the judiciary, as noted earlier.75 Further to the law, some 71 people were identified by the KRS 
as falling into one of the four categories and proceedings were initiated only to be discontinued, due to a 
lack of evidence or because several people had passed away. This, of course, concerns those individuals 
who qualified as judges or prosecutors. In five cases it was proved that there had been collaboration with 
the NKVD; in six cases it was proved that the persons worked for the Polish secret police in secret sections; 
in four cases the persons worked in the secret sections of the common courts; and in one in the secret 
section of the regional and district courts military courts. Significantly, the materials provided by the KRS 
indicate that the secret sections operated nationally, not only in Warsaw, as was held by scholars up until 
now.76 
After a debate about the meaning of violating the principles of judicial independence, a 1998 Law 
amending the Law on Common Courts, for example, meant that disciplinary measures could be initiated 
against judges who had rendered unjust rulings. Strzembosz reports that 30 cases concerning 48 judges 
were heard before the disciplinary court. Almost all the judges were criminal law judges, but only three 
judges were found to be in violation of the provision. The reports from the disciplinary proceedings show 
the careful scrutiny that was afforded to each case. It is worth quoting Strzembosz at length: 
 
75 See Mark Brzezinski, The Struggle for Constitutionalism in Poland (London: St Martin’s Press, 1998) 
and also Fijalkowski, supra note 10. 
76 Stanowska and Strzembosz, supra note 29, p. 274. 
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It must be said, that the findings are shocking. In addition to public opinion, which included 
individuals in high political standing, there was a profound belief that the judiciary was politically 
disposed…judges themselves knew who amongst them took on such a role.77  
 
For Strzembosz, who fought hard to support such a policy, the mistakes of a few cannot justify such 
generalisations; this is an easy trap to fall into. There is a temptation to fall sway to the powerful feelings 
that understandably emerge when confronted with miscarriages of justice such as these. 78 Some scholars 
advocate the position that the criminal trial is the catalyst for self-searching that is connected to the moral 
limits for the achievement of certain goals.79 We have seen how judicial identity includes the manner in 
which the judge gets to grip with the past and how,80 for Poland, a re-evaluation of the past might even 
involve a personal or official judicial verification process that can result in criminal prosecution and in a 
sense freeing the profession from the taint of the past, but equally81: 
not to release the judiciary from all forms of dependency, but rather to re-organize its dependency, 
freeing judges from the clandestine and ad hoc will of powerful members of the executive and 
subordinating them to publicly known and general rules promulgated by elected representatives.82 
 
This analysis of the Polish post-totalitarian legal landscape, in addition to showing the repressive nature of 
the laws and the regime, also illustrates the forces that worked for and against the judge and that the 
manner in which the memory is treated by the law will determine the strength of judicial independence and 
how we understand it. The discussion shows that the past does matter, but not as a determining factor nor as 
77 Ibid. 
78 See Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick, NJ, USA: Transaction 
Publishers, 1997). 
79 Ibid. 
80 See H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
81 And historical record. See Jiri Priban, Legal Symbolism: On Law, Time and European Identity 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
82 Holmes, supra note 69, p. 6. 
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a deterrent to attempt new and different measures:83 it demonstrates that generalisations simply cannot be 





In this paper I have considered the manner in which two judicial snapshots of two critical periods resurface 
in the present day. I have sought to understand the paradoxes that emerge as we try to construct a judicial 
identity. The judicial identity of the first two snapshots is shaped by a repressive history of violations of 
judicial independence while the judicial identity of the third snapshot holds the promise of a new future, but 
it is also held back by the past marred by judicial subjugation. Because the respective judiciaries were not 
permitted an equal standing alongside the executive and legislative branches of power, one of the main 
points of reform concerned judicial independence. Once involved in the construction of a judicial identity, 
the obstacle that re-emerges is politics in which practices from the past continue to dictate to a certain 
extent the manner in which the judiciary reasserts itself. As shown, efforts made by the judiciary to reassert 
itself following on from the Stalinist period only occurred when it was provided space through the 
retirement of the former cadre, the reform of legal education, and the development of civil society. Even 
during martial law, the courts sought to work around the draconian measures. It cannot be said that orders 
were followed blindly. But what can be assumed is that as long as these features are allowed to emerge, or 
to be reactivated, a viable third branch of power will never emerge. In other words, a judiciary needs to be 
empowered further to institutional guarantees. While relevant laws related to judicial independence have 
been reintroduced, they have become part of, or work alongside, a policy of self-cleansing, disciplinary 
measures, the criminal law, and the specific history. As criminal investigations and other related enquiries 
83 See Jiri Priban et al., eds., Systems of Justice in Transition. Central European Experiences Since 1989 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) and review by Martin Krygier in Law and Politics Book Review 14 (April 
2004) at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/Priban-Roberts-Yo404.htm (last accessed 
26 August 2011). Also see Martin Krygier, “The Constitution of the Heart”, Law and Social Inquiry, 20 
(1995), pp. 1033–1066. 
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continue,84 the Polish judge continues to be haunted by the ghost of a short-lived, but unforgotten – owing 
to the sheer terror and repression – period. These injustices, or the haunting, might never be exorcised. And 
if exorcised, what is the price to pay if not undermining the basic tenet of judicial independence and rule of 
law itself? Seeking justice needs to be a grounded exercise. Otherwise, like Hannibal Lecter, one might end 
up consuming the memory itself. 
84 The critical period is 2005–2007 when the Polish presidency was held by Lech Kaczynski, and his 
brother Jaroslaw was Prime Minister. The Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment of 11 May 2007 found six 
key aspects of the 2006 reform on lustration or screening laws unconstitutional. However, note the case of 
Justice Wyrzykowski of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (January 2010) and the role of the international 
commentary and role. Wyrzykowski was acquitted from charges of collaboration with the Polish secret 
police. See http://www.reed-




                                                 
